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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
GN Netcom, Inc. filed an antitrust lawsuit against 
competitor Plantronics, Inc. Plantronics executives deleted 
emails relevant to the litigation and instructed others to do the 
same. Many of these emails were unrecoverable, prompting 
GN to move for default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37. The District Court acted within its discretion 
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when it denied the motion for default judgment, instead 
instructing the jurors that they were permitted to draw an 
adverse inference against Plantronics because of the missing 
emails. However, the District Court committed reversible error 
when it excluded GN’s expert testimony on the scope of 
Plantronics’ spoliation. Accordingly, we will affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for a new trial. 
I.  
GN and Plantronics manufacture telephone audio 
headsets used by individuals who work in customer service. 
They have nearly equal market share globally. Plantronics is 
U.S.-based and “holds an 80%-83% market share” in North 
America, App. 1398, while GN is based in Europe and controls 
the market outside North America. 
Plantronics began selling its headsets in the United 
States in the 1960s, the first of their kind on the market. GN 
began its U.S.-based operations in 1987. In 2000, it acquired 
Jabra and began selling Jabra’s headsets, which serve the same 
market as Plantronics.  
The parties sell their headsets to customers through 
distributors.  Plantronics has a Plantronics-Only Distributor 
(“POD”) program, which is a voluntary program designed to 
foster relationships and create joint marketing efforts with 
distributors. A distributor that joins the program becomes a 
“POD” and receives incentives such as “favorable credit 
terms,” “marketing funds in the form of rebates,” and “website 
support.” App. 1306. In exchange, PODs agree to two terms. 
First, they may not purchase headsets directly from other 
manufacturers, but may do so indirectly (such as from other 
distributors). Second, PODs are not allowed to market 
competitors’ products on resellers’ websites. 
GN sent Plantronics a demand letter in May 2012 and 
filed suit in October 2012, alleging that Plantronics’ POD 
 
4 
program constituted monopolization in “violation[] of the 
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and Delaware common law.” 
App. 110.  When it received the demand letter, Plantronics 
“promptly issued a litigation hold to relevant employees and 
provided training sessions to ensure compliance.” App. 7. 
When the lawsuit was filed, Plantronics updated the hold, held 
more training sessions, and sent quarterly reminders requiring 
acknowledgment of compliance. 
GN alleges that Plantronics committed large-scale 
spoliation after the lawsuit was filed. Despite the litigation 
hold, Plantronics’ Senior Vice President of Sales, Don 
Houston, instructed Plantronics employees to delete certain 
emails that referenced Plantronics’ competitive practices or its 
competitors, particularly those concerning GN or its products. 
As the District Court noted, the evidence reflects at least three 
instances of such spoliation.  
First, in November 2012, about a month after GN filed 
its lawsuit, Houston replied to an email chain stating, “Team, 
please be careful about competitive statements like what was 
said below. I would suggest everyone immediately delete this 
message.” App. 184. In October 2013, Houston sent an email 
stating, “Given the sensitive nature of this issue and the on 
going legal issues, please delete this entire string of emails for 
everyone that has been copied ASAP!” App. 178. Houston 
admitted that the only legal issue he was aware of was the 
lawsuit filed by GN. The underlying email chain referenced a 
distributor who met with a Jabra representative and began 
selling Jabra headsets to one of its customers, who previously 
used only Plantronics headsets. One email in the chain stated, 
“I was under the impression [redacted distributor] was a POD 
distributor and could not sell Jabra,” and another employee 
stated he “want[ed] to be absolutely sure of the facts before I 
confront [redacted distributor].” App. 178, 180. Houston and 
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two others, Roy Meadows and Jose Gonzalez, deleted the 
email chain. 
In February or March 2014, Plantronics’ Associate 
General Counsel, Peggy Fawcett, learned of Houston’s 
conduct and took several actions in response, including 
instituting a litigation hold on Houston’s assistant, in case she 
had duplicate emails, and requesting back-up tapes of 
Houston’s email account. Plantronics engaged BlackStone 
Discovery, its discovery vendor, and Stroz Friedberg, a leading 
forensics expert, to try to recover as many of Houston’s emails 
as possible. Stroz recovered some of the emails.  
The spoliation, however, continued. In April 2014, for 
a third time, Houston instructed employees to delete emails: 
“Team this is an inappropriate email, please delete 
immediately. Bill should call Lou Ann directly for any 
information relating to competition or a competitive 
situation!!!” App. 181. 
In addition to instructing others to delete emails, 
Houston deleted his own emails. He deleted “more than 40% 
of his emails from” November 2013 to February 2014. App. 9. 
He took the next step of “double-delet[ing]” them by emptying 
his deleted-files folder so that he would not be able to recover 
them. App. 9.  
Houston did not act alone. Plantronics executives took 
other actions to hide relevant information from GN. For 
instance, a senior Plantronics manager asked sales team 
members to use code words to refer to competitors, including 
“zebra” for GN. At an “All Hands” meeting with marketing 
employees, Plantronics’ CEO, Ken Kannappan, stated that he 
was “not positive that there were not damning statements in a 
variety [of] staff emails that [GN’s] legal team would dig up 
that would be ‘emotionally relevant’ in court.” App. 325. 
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Plantronics’ efforts to undo the spoliation fell short. 
BlackStone Discovery confirmed that Meadows and Gonzalez 
had deleted at least one email chain, but Plantronics never 
obtained the backup tapes to determine whether they had 
deleted any other emails. Stroz, the forensics expert, provided 
Plantronics with “preliminary findings” that were a “work in 
progress,” but stated that it would cost Plantronics two to five 
thousand more dollars for the firm to complete its analysis. 
App. 11. Plantronics did not have Stroz complete its analysis; 
it instead destroyed the back-up tapes of Houston’s emails. At 
an April 2015 hearing, Plantronics told the District Court that 
“there is no [Stroz] report,” App. 246, despite Stroz providing 
its preliminary findings months before. In addition, the same 
lawyer who stated that there was no report had previously 
listed work on the “Stroz report” in billing entries. App. 12.  
Stroz’s preliminary findings included a determination 
that Houston had deleted between 36,397 and 90,574 
unrecoverable emails, 2380 to 5887 of which were likely 
responsive to GN’s discovery requests. While some of those 
emails were likely produced by other employees, Stroz 
estimated that 952 to 2354 of those emails were permanently 
missing and could not be recovered from other Plantronics 
employees’ accounts or backups. GN’s expert, Dan Gallivan, 
concluded that Stroz’s estimates were conservative; Gallivan 
independently determined that ten to fifteen thousand of 
Houston’s deleted emails were relevant to the litigation.  
During depositions, Plantronics executives, including 
Houston and Kannappan, were either forgetful or dishonest. In 
his July 2014 deposition, Houston acknowledged asking others 
to delete emails, but stated he could not remember deleting his 
own emails. And though Plantronics had admitted knowing 
about Houston’s deletions at the time of his deposition, its 
outside counsel emailed GN’s outside counsel after the 
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deposition, stating, “It is incorrect to assume deletion as you 
suggest,” because Houston had testified that he did not 
remember. App. 187. 
At a subsequent deposition in September 2015, Houston 
testified that he thought the IT department saved all emails and 
that he was not instructing employees to delete emails to hide 
them, but because he did not “want the dialogue to continue.” 
App. 202. On more than one occasion, Kannappan testified that 
all of Houston’s emails were recovered. The reports from 
Plantronics’ discovery and forensic experts contradicted that 
testimony. 
Two months after Houston’s second deposition, GN 
moved for a default liability judgment in light of the spoliation. 
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and found that 
Plantronics acted in “bad faith” with an “intent to deprive GN” 
of documents, App. 33, but nevertheless denied the motion. 
Instead of default judgment, the court opted to issue a 
permissive adverse inference instruction to the jury at trial, fine 
Plantronics three million dollars, and order it to pay GN’s 
spoliation-related fees. In choosing a permissive instruction 
rather than a mandatory one, the court reasoned that “[a] jury 
should resolve the genuine disputes of material fact in this 
case.” App. 34–35. 
 GN subsequently sought to present evidence of 
spoliation at trial, including testimony from its expert, 
Gallivan. The District Court denied this request, citing a desire 
to reduce “the risk of spoliation taking over” the trial and “the 
risk of unfair prejudice given the inflammatory nature of the 
evidence.” App. 1044. Instead, the court decided to read 
“stipulations” to the jury and limit parties to referencing only 
the facts in those stipulations during trial. App. 1043–44. After 
considering proposals from both parties, the District Court 
settled on seventeen stipulations. 
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 At trial, GN proceeded on claims of monopolization, 
attempted monopolization, and concerted action in restraint of 
trade under the Sherman and Clayton Acts.1 The trial lasted for 
six days. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plantronics, 
finding that GN proved a relevant market—a prerequisite for 
its claims—but did not prove all of the elements for any of its 
three antitrust claims. GN moved for a new trial, but the 
District Court denied the motion. GN appeals. 
II.  
 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over 
GN’s antitrust claims under the Sherman and Clayton Acts and 
supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law tortious 
interference claim. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. This Court has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review 
the District Court’s sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37, as well as its evidentiary rulings, for abuse of 
discretion. McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 
756 F.3d 240, 248 (3d Cir. 2014); Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 
F.3d 344, 349 (3d Cir. 2005).  
III.  
A. Rule 37 sanctions 
Under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
a district court may sanction a party that destroys electronically 
stored information “with the intent to deprive another party of 
the information’s use in the litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2). 
The court may presume the information was unfavorable to the 
infracting party, instruct the jury that it may or must presume 
the information was unfavorable, or dismiss the action. Id. A 
district court abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions when 
                                              
1 GN chose to abandon its Delaware law claim of 
tortious interference before trial, with Plantronics’ consent.  
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it “base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a 
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Grider v. 
Keystone Health Plan Central, Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 134 (3d Cir. 
2009) (quoting Bowers v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 
524, 538 (3d Cir. 2007), amended on grant of reh’g (March 8, 
2007)). 
We have laid out three factors district courts must 
consider when contemplating Rule 37 sanctions:  
(1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or 
destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of 
prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3) 
whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid 
substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, 
where the offending party is seriously at fault, 
will serve to deter such conduct by others in the 
future. 
Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 
1994). A dispositive sanction is warranted only where “the 
non-responsible party’s case is severely impaired because it 
lacked the information that was not produced.” Bull v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 83 (3d Cir. 2012).  
When considering evidence of significant spoliation by 
Plantronics, the District Court found that Plantronics had a 
high degree of fault and that GN was prejudiced, but opted for 
the lesser sanction of a permissive adverse inference 
instruction. The court made no error of fact or law in reaching 
its conclusion. 
 The District Court determined that Plantronics “did act 
in bad faith, ‘intend[ing] to impair the ability of the other side 
to effectively litigate its case.’” App. 23 (quoting In re 
Weschler, 121 F. Supp. 2d 404, 423 (D. Del. 2003)); see also 
Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1326 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (holding a party must have “intended to impair the 
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ability” of a litigant to put on a case or defend itself to find “bad 
faith” (quoting Schmid, 13 F.3d at 80)). Houston deliberately 
deleted an unknown number of emails in response to “pending 
litigation” and urged others to do the same. Plantronics 
executives, including its CEO, were not truthful during 
depositions. And the company was not willing to spend a 
nominal fee for its expert, Stroz, to fully assess the spoliation 
and create a final report. Each of these actions was an 
intentional step to interfere with GN’s prosecution of its claims 
against Plantronics. Therefore, the District Court reasonably 
concluded that Plantronics acted in bad faith.  
 Likewise, the District Court reasonably determined that 
the spoliation prejudiced GN. When a party moving for 
spoliation sanctions cannot offer “plausible, concrete 
suggestions as to what [the lost] evidence might have been,” 
there should be no finding of prejudice. Schmid, 13 F.3d at 80. 
That is not the case here. It is undisputed that there is some 
number of emails that were deleted and will never be 
recovered. GN has plausibly suggested that those emails might 
contain, among other things, important information on the 
number of PODs and evidence of coercion of PODs. Indeed, 
Plantronics’ own CEO stated that there may have been 
“damning statements” in some of the emails. We will never 
know whether those damning statements exist or if one or more 
of them would have been integral to GN’s case, but GN has 
provided plausible, concrete suggestions as to what that 
evidence might have been. Plantronics employees’ spoliation, 
its executives’ false testimony, and its failure to pay Stroz to 
complete its report prejudiced GN. 
 Having found that Plantronics acted in bad faith and GN 
was prejudiced, the District Court determined that a lesser 
sanction than default judgment could avoid substantial 
unfairness while also deterring misconduct by future litigants. 
 
11 
The court thoroughly examined alternatives to default 
judgment and provided due consideration to their fairness and 
deterrent value, and it committed no error of law or assessment 
of fact in the process. 
 GN argues that the weight of authority from district 
courts and circuits around the country demands that the District 
Court enter default judgment in its favor. In support, GN offers 
a laundry list of cases where district courts granted dispositive 
sanctions and our sister circuits affirmed the harshest sanction. 
GN argues that in some of these cases, the spoliation was less 
extensive than what occurred here, but the result was a 
dispositive sanction. However, the notion that a list of selected 
cases mandates default judgment ignores that a district court’s 
inquiry is intensely fact-specific. Several cases that GN cites 
involve destruction of the most critical evidence, resulting in 
irreparable prejudice. See, e.g., Flury v. Daimler Chrysler 
Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 943 (11th Cir. 2005) (dismissing 
crashworthiness action where plaintiff allowed vehicle to be 
sold for salvage before the defendant could inspect it); Silvestri 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 585 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(dismissing manufacturing defect suit where plaintiff had 
vehicle repaired before defendant could inspect it, effectively 
destroying the “sole piece of evidence in th[e] case”). The 
destroyed evidence is not so clearly central or critical here. 
While the emails may have contained information about 
additional PODs, helping to prove a piece of GN’s antitrust 
suit, any deleted emails are not as central as a vehicle in a 
crashworthiness case, and are certainly not the “sole piece of 
evidence.” Moreover, while the District Court was free to look 
to cases from other circuits to inform its analysis, our sister 
circuits have carved out their own tests for the appropriateness 
of dispositive sanctions, and those tests are not necessarily 
identical to the three considerations we laid out in Schmid. 
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GN points in particular to Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead 
Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Fla. 1987), where the 
individual who ordered the company-wide destruction of 
documents was the corporation’s legal counsel, and he did so 
on the day that the complaint and request for production were 
served on him personally. Id. at 109. The district court 
considered this timeline to reflect “a willful and intentional 
attempt to place documentation . . . forever beyond the reach 
of [opposing] counsel.” Id. at 109–10. In this case, Houston is 
not a lawyer, and the District Court found that his innocuous 
explanation for his deletion directive was “somewhat 
plausible,” App. 21, suggesting that Houston’s conduct was not 
as culpable as in Telectron.  And, unlike in Telectron and other 
cases where the court ordered dispositive sanctions, 
Plantronics’ counsel took steps to remedy Houston’s spoliation 
the moment she learned of it. GN’s proffer of cases where there 
was “less” spoliation and the courts granted dispositive 
sanctions only serves to highlight that these decisions are 
extremely fact-dependent and that there can be no bright-line 
rule regarding what degree or percentage of destroyed 
documents warrants default judgment.  
The District Court appropriately relied on the principle 
that a dispositive sanction “is a last resort and should be 
imposed if no alternative remedy is available.” App. 35 
(quoting Magnetar Techs. Corp. v. Six Flags Theme Park Inc., 
886 F. Supp. 2d 466, 481 (D. Del. 2012)); see also Schmid, 13 
F.3d at 79 (“[C]ourts select the least onerous sanction 
corresponding to the willfulness of the destructive act and the 
prejudice suffered by the victim.” (quoting Jamie S. Gorelick 
et al., Destruction of Evidence § 3.16 (1989)). Through that 
lens, the court devoted four pages of its opinion to considering 
whether a package of lesser sanctions would avoid substantial 
unfairness to GN and would deter future misconduct. It 
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determined that, because some of the relevant emails were 
recovered, a permissive adverse inference instruction would be 
effective as it would allow the jury to see the types of recovered 
emails and draw conclusions about what the deleted emails 
contained. Along with the instruction, the court permitted GN 
to propose other evidentiary sanctions for the court’s 
consideration. And, both to punish Plantronics and to deter 
misconduct of this nature by future litigants further, the court 
levied punitive sanctions and costs on Plantronics to the tune 
of nearly five million dollars. 
There was no error of fact or law in the District Court’s 
examination of whether lesser sanctions would be appropriate 
under Schmid, nor in its decision to impose a package of 
sanctions in lieu of default judgment. GN asks for nothing 
more than a different conclusion based on our consideration of 
the same facts and law that the District Court examined. That 
is not the standard. Absent a specific error of law or clearly 
erroneous assessment of fact, we will not hold that the court 
abused its discretion in making the difficult and highly fact-
specific decision of whether and how to avoid a last-resort 
dispositive sanction. 
B. Exclusion of Gallivan’s testimony 
The District Court abused its discretion in excluding 
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Gallivan’s expert testimony regarding Plantronics’ spoliation.2 
The testimony would have been highly probative of whether 
the jury should adopt the permissive adverse inference, and any 
potential prejudice would not have substantially outweighed 
the testimony’s probative value; it therefore should have been 
admitted. Further, the District Court’s error was not harmless, 
as it is possible that the exclusion affected the outcome of the 
case. 
1. The District Court erred in excluding 
Gallivan’s testimony 
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402 provide that, 
unless otherwise proscribed, evidence is relevant and 
admissible “if it tends to make the existence or nonexistence of 
a disputed material fact more probable than it would be without 
that evidence.” Forrest, 424 F.3d at 355 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 
401, 402). However, relevant evidence may be excluded “if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, 
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.  
 “Rule 403 recognizes that a cost/benefit analysis must 
                                              
2 Plantronics argues that because Gallivan was not on 
GN’s trial witness list, GN waived its right to appeal the 
exclusion of his testimony. However, GN expressed its desire 
to have Gallivan testify on more than occasion. After the court 
made its decision on stipulations, GN filed a brief reiterating 
its desire to have live testimony rather than stipulations. GN 
correctly argues that under the rules of evidence, a “party need 
not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of 
error for appeal” if the court issued a pretrial ruling excluding 
evidence the party had proposed to include. Fed. R. Evid. 
103(a)(2), (b). The issue is amply preserved for our review. 
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be employed to determine whether or not to admit evidence; 
relevance alone does not ensure its admissibility.” Coleman v. 
Home Depot, Inc., 306 F.3d 1333, 1343 (3d Cir. 2002).  
However, “[a]s we have explained on several occasions, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence suggest a ‘generally liberal 
approach to the admissibility of evidence.’” United States v. 
Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 314 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Unisys 
Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 167 (3d Cir. 1999)). Thus, 
“there is a strong presumption that relevant evidence should be 
admitted, and thus for exclusion under Rule 403 to be justified, 
the probative value of evidence must be ‘substantially 
outweighed’ by the problems in admitting it.” Coleman, 306 
F.3d at 1343–44. This presumption in favor of admission 
requires weighing “the maximum reasonable probative force 
for the offered evidence” against the “likely prejudicial impact 
of the evidence.” Id. at 1344 (quoting Federal Rules of 
Evidence Manual 242 (Stephen A. Saltzburg et al. eds., 7th ed. 
1998)). In sum, highly probative evidence is “exceptionally 
difficult to exclude.” Id. 
In reviewing a district court’s decision whether to admit 
evidence, we “strongly prefer” for the court to have explicitly 
undertaken a Rule 403 balancing analysis. Egan v. Del. River 
Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 277 (3d Cir. 2017). When the court 
does so, we review its rationale and conclusion for abuse of 
discretion. Forrest, 424 F.3d at 349. If we decide that the 
district court implicitly performed the balance, we likewise 
review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Eufrasio, 935 
F.2d 553, 572 (3d Cir. 1991). If it did not perform the balancing 
test, even implicitly, “we undertake to perform the balance 
ourselves.” Forrest, 424 F.3d at 355 (quoting Ansell v. Green 
Acres Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 525 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
 At no point did the District Court undertake an explicit 
Rule 403 balancing on the record. However, because no 
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application of the correct law to the facts of this case would 
warrant exclusion of the expert’s testimony, we need not 
determine whether the District Court implicitly conducted a 
balancing test. Under both the abuse of discretion standard and 
de novo standard, we conclude that Gallivan’s testimony 
should have been admitted.   
 As a threshold matter, Gallivan’s proposed testimony is 
undoubtedly relevant under the Rule 401 definition. The 
District Court’s permissive adverse inference instruction made 
Plantronics’ spoliation a material issue for the jury to consider 
at trial, so any spoliation-related evidence clears the baseline 
relevance hurdle of Rules 401 and 402. To exclude Gallivan’s 
relevant testimony, then, the evidence must confuse the issues, 
mislead the jury, cause undue delay, waste time, be unfairly 
prejudicial, and/or needlessly present cumulative evidence, 
and the negative impact of any of those conditions must 
substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value. It does 
not.  
 We must first examine the probative value of the 
proposed evidence. As proffered, Gallivan’s proposed 
testimony would have tended to show that the scope of 
Houston’s spoliation was more significant than Plantronics had 
represented, thereby helping the jury decide whether to draw 
an adverse inference—as it was instructed it could do. The 
District Court explicitly chose to put certain issues of material 
fact, such as whether Plantronics engaged in a “massive cover-
up to hide antitrust violations,” App. 34, in the jury’s hands. 
By withholding evidence regarding the scope of the spoliation, 
the court deprived the jury of the ability to make an informed 
decision about the adverse inference, and the instruction was 
less effective. See Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 
739, 750 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that without relevant 
evidence related to missing information, “the jury is deprived 
 
17 
of sufficient information on which to base a rational decision 
of whether to apply the adverse inference”).  
Gallivan could have helped provide the jury with a 
fuller picture. For instance, GN proffers that Gallivan would 
have testified that Stroz’s analytical techniques resulted in an 
incorrect estimate on the number of relevant emails Houston 
deleted—and that, in fact, Houston deleted up to five times 
more relevant emails than Plantronics reported. GN also argues 
that Gallivan would have provided the jury with a crucial 
expert opinion on why his estimates, rather than Stroz’s, were 
correct.  
That fuller picture could have had an impact on the 
merits of GN’s antitrust claims. For instance, GN was required 
to prove that Plantronics coerced distributors to enter into POD 
agreements and to remain PODs. Houston was a key player in 
the administration of the POD program. He deleted and 
encouraged others to delete at least one email chain that 
suggested Plantronics employees confronted PODs that 
purchased or even talked with competitors. If Plantronics 
employees made similar statements regularly, or directly 
pressured distributors via email, it is very likely that Houston 
would have been included on or forwarded the email. Whether 
Houston deleted hundreds of emails or thousands may have 
impacted the jury’s conclusion on how many similar email 
chains were lost. 
The dissent minimizes the probative value of Gallivan’s 
testimony by listing five stipulations that could have helped the 
jury draw an inference about the degree of Plantronics’ 
spoliation. However, none of the five proffered stipulations 
materially address the scope of spoliation or render Gallivan’s 
testimony superfluous. Indeed, the only stipulation on the 
scope that the District Court read to the jury casts more 
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uncertainty on the number of deleted relevant emails: “[I]t may 
be that several hundred or even up to 15,000 potentially 
responsive relevant emails were deleted or destroyed.” App. 
1315. This vagueness left the jury to consider estimates that 
were not even in the same ballpark, with no additional 
information as to which ballpark was more likely and why. 
Gallivan would have provided that additional information. He 
would have testified that Stroz’s methodology was flawed, 
leading to a low estimate of 2380 to 5887 unrecoverable 
relevant emails, and he would have asserted that between 
10,000 and 15,000 unrecoverable relevant emails were deleted. 
The two experts’ estimates are not close, and, counter to both 
experts estimates, the above-referenced stipulation broadens 
the ranger further yet to state that only “several hundred” 
relevant emails may have been destroyed. The difference from 
several hundred to 15,000 could easily have been the 
difference between applying the adverse inference and not.  
Gallivan’s expert testimony would have assisted the 
jury in narrowing that range, giving it evidence on which it 
could base an important decision: whether Plantronics engaged 
in a “massive cover-up.” Without Gallivan’s testimony, it is 
possible, if not entirely probable, that jurors concluded that 
only a few hundred emails were deleted, falling short of a 
massive cover-up; however, if they had evidence that fifteen, 
five, or even just one thousand emails had been deleted, they 
might have taken a very different view on whether to apply the 
adverse inference. If found credible by the jury, Gallivan’s 
testimony would have made a material fact in dispute—
whether Plantronics engaged in a massive cover-up—more 
likely to be true. And, in fact, Gallivan’s testimony could have 
assisted the jury in making its determination on some of the 
antitrust claim issues, such as whether Plantronics’ POD 
arrangements were coercive. The “maximum reasonable 
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probative force” of his testimony was high; therefore, the 
District Court could have properly excluded it only if that 
probative value was substantially outweighed by the 
evidence’s potential prejudice or by other risks outlined in Rule 
403. 
Gallivan’s testimony did not carry risks that would 
substantially outweigh its probative value. First, Gallivan’s 
testimony would not have been likely to confuse the issues or 
mislead the jury. The jury was presented with significant 
instruction by the District Court on the permissive adverse 
inference, along with seventeen spoliation stipulations. Adding 
the testimony would have provided additional evidence to 
expound upon the stipulations and increase the jury’s 
understanding of the situation, rather than confuse or mislead. 
And, if confusion or misdirection was a concern, the court 
could have provided a limiting instruction. See McQueeney v. 
Wilmington Tr. Co., 779 F.2d 916, 923 n.8 (3d Cir. 1985). 
Likewise, Gallivan’s testimony would not have caused 
undue delay or wasted time. GN estimated that it would only 
need about a half hour for direct examination of Gallivan at 
trial. Even if that were overly optimistic, and even if cross took 
the same amount of time as direct, Gallivan’s testimony would 
have required a couple of hours out of a six-day trial. Given the 
probative value of the testimony, this would not have 
constituted “undue delay” or a “waste” of the court’s or the 
parties’ time. 
Gallivan’s testimony would not have been 
unnecessarily cumulative. Instead, it would have added to and 
further explained the seventeen stipulations that the District 
Court read to the jury. It would not have simply rehashed those 
stipulations, but provided information to help the jury decide 
in favor of or against adopting the adverse inference.  
 Further, though the testimony could have had some 
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prejudicial effect, that prejudice would not have been unfair. 
The testimony about Plantronics’ employees deleting emails 
relevant to the litigation might color the jury’s opinion of 
Plantronics and prejudice its view of the company on issues 
unrelated to spoliation, and additional trial time spent on 
spoliation dilutes the amount of the trial devoted directly to the 
merits of GN’s antitrust claims. However, “[i]t is worth 
stressing that the term ‘unfair prejudice’ . . . is often misstated 
as mere prejudice.” Coleman, 306 F.3d at 1343 n.6. 
“‘[P]rejudice does not simply mean damage to the opponent’s 
cause.’ If it did, most relevant evidence would be deemed 
‘prejudicial.’” Goodman v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 
670 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 1 McCormick on Evidence § 185 
(John W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999)); see also 
McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 923 (holding that “absen[t] . . . a 
showing of particularized danger of unfair prejudice, the 
evidence must be admitted”). The potential for jurors to 
distrust Plantronics’ employees and the few hours that would 
be taken from the merits of the case hardly amount to a risk of 
“unfair” prejudice, particularly given that the stipulations 
already alerted the jury to the willingness of Plantronics’ 
executives to destroy and direct the destruction of relevant 
evidence. 
Even looking generously at Rule 403’s considerations, 
the potential for Gallivan’s testimony to negatively affect 
Plantronics does not outweigh, much less substantially 
outweigh, the evidence’s high probative value. In excluding 
that evidence, the District Court stated only that it was 
concerned that live testimony would be inflammatory and 
prejudicial without offering specifics. The dissent correctly 
notes that we are highly deferential to a district court’s 
conclusion on whether to admit evidence under FRE 403. 
However, when a court excludes highly probative evidence 
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that is not clearly and substantially outweighed by significant 
unfair prejudice to the opposing party, we must conclude that 
the court abused its discretion. See McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 
923. Gallivan’s testimony should have been admitted. 
2. The exclusion was not harmless error 
We will not reverse if the District Court’s error was 
harmless, that is, “if it is highly probable that the error did not 
affect the outcome of the case.” Glass v. Phila. Elec. Co., 34 
F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Lockhart v. 
Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 53, 59 (3d Cir. 
1989)). “‘High probability’ requires that the court have a ‘sure 
conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendant,’ but 
need not disprove every ‘reasonable possibility’ of prejudice.” 
United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 290 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(quoting United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 219–20 & n.2 
(3d Cir. 1984)).3 Plantronics argues that GN did not “identify 
exactly how more evidence on the issue of spoliation . . . would 
have . . . overcome the weight of the facts against GN.” 
Appellee’s Br. 53. That is not the standard. GN is not tasked 
with proving “exactly” how Gallivan’s testimony would have 
altered the outcome of the case. Rather, to the contrary, we 
must have a “sure conviction that the error did not prejudice” 
GN, or we cannot deem the District Court’s error harmless. 
Grayson, 795 F.2d at 290.  
Gallivan’s testimony could have shaped the jury’s 
verdict, and the District Court’s error in excluding it was not 
harmless. There was evidence of significant spoliation in this 
                                              
3 “In the context of non-constitutional harmless error, 
the civil and criminal standards of review are no different.” 
Lockhart, 879 F.2d at 59 n.1 (citing McQueeney, 879 F.2d at 
927). 
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case and allegations that some of the destroyed evidence was 
damning to Plantronics’ defense. The District Court instructed 
the jury to determine whether Plantronics’ spoliation was a 
massive cover-up, whether the missing evidence was damning, 
and whether it wished to draw an adverse inference. Gallivan’s 
excluded testimony could have assisted the jury in making 
those determinations, and thus could have changed the 
outcome of the case. We have determined that an error was not 
harmless in less weighty situations. See, e.g., Renda v. King, 
347 F.3d 550, 556–57 (3d Cir. 2003) (improperly excluding 
evidence of a witness’s character for truthfulness was not 
harmless); McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 930–31 (improperly 
excluding plaintiff’s work records, which were relevant to the 
damages determination, was not harmless). 
We do not have the requisite sure conviction that GN 
was not prejudiced by the exclusion of Gallivan’s testimony, 
so the error was not harmless. Accordingly, we will grant a new 
trial.4    
                                              
4 GN also argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion by improperly including stipulations that ignored 
GN’s proposed stipulations and cast Plantronics’ efforts to 
prevent spoliation and recover lost information in a positive 
light. However, GN cites no authorities to support its position, 
and other than excluding Gallivan’s testimony, discussed 
above, the District Court made no “clearly erroneous finding 
of fact, errant conclusion of law or an improper application of 
law to fact” that would constitute an abuse of discretion. 
Forrest, 424 F.3d at 349 (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 
F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000)). With its unbiased and factually 
correct stipulations, the court provided a broad, general picture 
of spoliation from start to finish, and it did not play favorites 
when selecting which pieces to include from GN’s and 
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IV.  
We will affirm in part and reverse in part, and we will 
remand for a new trial. 
                                              
Plantronics’ proposed stipulations. The stipulations’ greatest 
deficiency was the vagueness of the scope of spoliation, which 
will be remedied by the inclusion of expert testimony from 
Gallivan or others on remand. Nevertheless, the court will have 
the opportunity to reconsider whether to utilize stipulations, 
live testimony (in addition to Gallivan), or both at the new trial. 
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GN Netcom Inc. v. Plantronics Inc., No. 18-1287 
SMITH, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
 I agree with my colleagues that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion by imposing a permissive adverse 
inference sanction, and I therefore join Section III.A of the 
majority opinion.  I write separately to add two points to the 
majority’s cogent analysis of why it was permissible for the 
Court to impose this sanction and not a harsher one.  Where I 
part ways with the majority is in its conclusion that the District 
Court impermissibly prevented GN’s spoliation expert, Dan 
Gallivan, from testifying.  I therefore dissent from Section 
III.B.    
I. 
I begin by directly responding to two of GN’s 
challenges to the District Court’s permissive inference sanction 
that lack merit. 
First, I reject GN’s argument that the District Court 
erred by imposing a permissive inference because it “was the 
equivalent of no sanction at all.”  Appellant’s Br. 36.  The 
permissive inference had bite because in explaining it to the 
jury, the District Court authoritatively told the jury of 
Plantronics’s misconduct and thereby “brand[ed] [Plantronics] 
as a bad actor.”  Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 900 
(8th Cir. 2004); see also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 
384 (1990) (explaining that juries view deferentially 
statements of a district court).  Moreover, GN seems to suggest 
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that the absence of Don Houston’s emails did not prevent it 
from winning on the merits—a further indication that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to 
impose default judgment against Plantronics.  See Schmid v. 
Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(instructing district courts to “select the least onerous 
sanction”).  By asserting that only default judgment was 
appropriate, GN effectively contends that the Court, not the 
jury, should have conclusively decided the extent of the 
prejudice GN suffered from the spoliation.  The jury, however, 
was the factfinder, and therefore it was permissible for the 
District Court to entrust this assessment to the jury.  See 
Blinzler v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1159 (1st Cir. 
1996); see also Schmid, 13 F.3d at 79 (stating that one of the 
central goals of discovery sanctions is “to restore the accuracy 
of the trial” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  
Second, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
by declining to impose a mandatory adverse inference 
instruction.  Contrary to GN’s suggestion, the weight of 
authority in fact supports the District Court’s choice of a 
permissive adverse inference.  See Schmid, 13 F.3d at 79; 
Beaven v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 622 F.3d 540, 555 (6th Cir. 
2010) (noting that “an adverse inference is usually only 
permissive for the factfinder”); Blinzler, 81 F.3d at 1159 
(explaining that adverse inference sanctions for the spoliation 
of evidence should be “permissive, not mandatory”); Akiona v. 
United States, 938 F.2d 158, 161 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Generally, 
a trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from the 
destruction of evidence relevant to a case.” (emphasis added)); 
Beck v. Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc., 289 F.R.D. 374, 380 
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(D.D.C. 2013) (stating that “[c]ase law overwhelmingly favors 
using a permissive rather than mandatory instruction” and 
collecting cases).  And other courts’ decisions to impose 
mandatory adverse inferences hardly means that the District 
Court abused its discretion here.  “Whether an adverse 
inference is permissive or mandatory is determined on a case-
by-case basis.”  Flagg v. City of Detroit, 715 F.3d 165, 178 
(6th Cir. 2013).  Finally, GN is wrong to contend that a 
mandatory adverse inference was necessary because the 
spoliation evidence in the record was inadequate for the jury to 
rationally decide whether to adopt the permissive adverse 
inference.  As explained in Part II below, the Court gave the 
jury a sufficient evidentiary basis to decide whether it should 
adopt the permissive inference. 
II. 
Without a doubt, Plantronics deserves to be called out 
for its substantial discovery misconduct in this case.  It 
repeatedly flouted its obligations as a litigant, depriving GN of 
discovery and failing to take all reasonable steps to preserve 
responsive electronically stored information.  As the District 
Court found and the majority rightly concludes, Plantronics 
acted in bad faith.  The question for the District Court then 
became: what to do about it?    
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the District 
Court abused its discretion in declining to admit Dan 
Gallivan’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.  In 
my view, the majority makes two errors.  First, it minimizes 
the information regarding the extent of Plantronics’s spoliation 
that the District Court provided to the jury via the stipulations.  
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These stipulations gave the jury an adequate basis to decide 
whether to adopt the permissive adverse inference.  Second, 
the majority fails to give the required deference to the District 
Court’s reasonable conclusions that Gallivan’s spoliation 
testimony posed a substantial risk of distracting the jury from 
the antitrust merits of the case and that such risk eclipsed the 
testimony’s probative value.  In sum, not only do I fail to detect 
error, I commend the District Judge for his innovative and 
effective exercise of case-management discretion.  See United 
States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 176 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that 
district courts have “broad discretion” to engage in “case 
management both before and during trial”).  By remanding, the 
majority not only sets the stage for another antitrust trial but 
probably for a not-so-mini spoliation trial as well.1   
The tried and true abuse-of-discretion standard governs 
our review of the District Court’s evidentiary ruling because 
by implicitly weighing the probative value of Gallivan’s 
proposed testimony and explicitly considering the risks of its 
admission, the District Court performed a Rule 403 balancing 
analysis.  See Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 
                                              
1  I acknowledge the majority’s statement that, on remand, the 
District Court may again use stipulations to encapsulate the 
parties’ evidence regarding the extent of Plantronics’s 
spoliation.  But given the majority’s conclusion that “no 
application of the correct law to the facts of this case would 
warrant exclusion of the expert’s testimony,” it seems 
unavoidable that the District Court will be required on remand 
to permit live testimony on spoliation, leading to the mini-trial 
that the District Court sought to avoid. 
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515, 525 (3d Cir. 2003).  When the District Court made its Rule 
403 determination, it had Gallivan’s report containing the 
details of his proposed testimony.  The Court implicitly 
considered the probative value of Gallivan’s testimony by 
concluding that the parties should agree to “stipulations” 
regarding the spoliation evidence in place of witness 
testimony.  The Court explained its calculus that the value of 
spoliation testimony was outweighed by the risk that such 
testimony would confuse the jury and result in jurors deciding 
to punish Plantronics for its spoliation instead of deciding this 
case on its merits.  Because the abuse-of-discretion standard 
governs our review of the Court’s decision to exclude 
Gallivan’s testimony, we should not reverse unless we have “a 
definite and firm conviction that the court … committed a clear 
error of judgment in the conclusion it reached.”  In re Cendant 
Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(alternation in original) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  In my view, GN has failed to satisfy this highly 
deferential standard.     
To be sure, Gallivan’s testimony would have had non-
negligible probative value, but the District Court read five 
stipulations to the jury that provided a basis for drawing a 
reasonable inference about the degree of Plantronics’s 
spoliation (whether it was closer to “several hundred” or 
“15,000” deleted relevant emails that Plantronics did not 
recover2). App. 1315.  All five of the following stipulations 
                                              
2  The majority faults the District Court for unnecessarily 
increasing the uncertainty about the number of unrecovered 
relevant emails by presenting this range, but GN approved of 
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signaled to the jury that it could find reason to mistrust 
Plantronics’s representations regarding its discovery 
misconduct and therefore infer that Plantronics’s spoliation 
was at the higher end of the range:   
(1) “At least part of the motivation for the e-mail 
deletion was to deprive GN of evidence to use in this 
litigation.”  Id. 
 
(2) “By one estimate, 482 of the 487 e-mails containing 
the term ‘GN’ or ‘Jabra’ [the name that GN uses for 
its headsets] were missing from the initial collection 
of Mr. Houston’s emails.  The parties do not agree 
as to whether this is a reliable estimate.”  Id. 
  
(3) Plantronics “did not take all steps it could have taken 
to recover the deleted emails.”  Id. 
 
(4) A 17-month period elapsed during which Houston, 
Plantronics’s “senior vice president for U.S. 
Commercial Sales,” may have deleted emails.  Id.   
 
(5) Plantronics did not have backup tapes of Houston’s 
emails for any time during this 17-month period.  
 
                                              
this range in the District Court.  GN’s lawyer told the Court 
that he was “fine” with it informing the jury that “it may be that 
several hundred or even up to 15,000 potentially responsive 
relevant e-mails were deleted or destroyed.”  App. 1291.     
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Given that the jury had these stipulations, the District Court 
ensured that it had “sufficient information on which to base a 
rational decision of whether to apply the adverse inference.”  
Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 750 (8th Cir. 
2004).  Here, the stipulations provided the jury with sufficient 
evidence to reach an informed judgment about the degree of 
Plantronics’s spoliation and thereby fulfill its fundamental 
responsibility to draw inferences based on the record.  
Cf. Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 
1071–72 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Pena-Santo, 809 F.3d 
686, 701 n.10 (1st Cir. 2015).  I fail to see how this record 
provides a basis for the majority to form a definite and firm 
conviction that the jury lacked enough information to draw a 
reasonable inference concerning the extent of Plantronics’s 
spoliation. 
   In addition, the majority does not accord appropriate 
deference to the District Court’s conclusion that admitting 
Gallivan’s testimony posed a significant risk that the jury’s 
focus would be shifted from the merits of the antitrust case they 
had been sworn to decide.  This is a classic example of the sort 
of discretionary call that trial judges are far better situated to 
make than those of us who are confined to reviewing a cold 
record.  In my view, the District Court reasonably concluded 
that admitting Gallivan’s testimony and rebuttal might result in 
“spoliation taking over what is going to be an antitrust trial.”  
App. 1044.  And GN’s antitrust claims were far from 
straightforward—four antitrust claims went to the jury, thereby 
requiring its members to make multiple findings from record 
evidence concerning, inter alia, commercial decision-making 
and economic forces that are hardly a part of the average 
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citizen’s daily experience.3  It was reasonable for the District 
Court to carefully limit the amount of spoliation evidence 
admitted so that the jury would focus on the merits.4   While 
GN’s lawyer estimated that Gallivan’s testimony would take 
about 30 minutes, it is highly speculative for the majority to 
assert that addressing spoliation would require only “a couple 
of hours.”  And in any event, it is a usurpation of the trial 
judge’s role for this Court to second guess a determination 
made immediately before trial regarding the appropriate 
quantum of evidence on an issue, albeit relevant but collateral 
to the merits of the antitrust case.  
 Not only do I lack a definite and firm conviction that the 
District Judge erred, I consider his limitation on the admission 
of certain spoliation evidence to have been a sound exercise of 
discretion.  The abuse-of-discretion standard demands that we 
give him the benefit of the doubt on whether to admit 
                                              
3  For example, the jury had to assess whether GN established 
relevant geographic and product markets, whether Plantronics 
had market power, whether Plantronics substantially 
foreclosed GN from competing in the headset market, and 
whether Plantronics’s POD agreements caused GN to lose 
sales.   
  
4  Notwithstanding the majority’s suggestion, I do not 
minimize the probative value of Gallivan’s testimony.  Rather, 
I conclude that the District Court permissibly determined that 
the risk of spoliation testimony sidetracking the jury from the 
case’s merits outweighed this testimony’s probative value.  
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Gallivan’s testimony.  The majority fails to afford him that 
deference. 
I respectfully dissent. 
